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**by Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia**

Recently, JC Beall has been trying to show that the (transparent) truth predicate is logical in a sense that, say, the logical consequence relation is not. As far as I can tell his strategy goes along the following lines:

There is a sense in which both the truth operator (and the truth predicate) and the logical consequence operator (and relation) are topic neutral: both apply to propositions regardless of their content. In other words, for any *P* and *Q,* no matter the topic, the proposition that *P* is true and the proposition that *P* follows from *Q* are both acceptable. However, there seems to ve a further sense in which they are not equally topic neutral. True propositions of the form ‘*P* follows from *Q*’ are made true, not by facts regarding the topics *P* and *Q* are about, but by logical facts about the relation of logical consequence. In contrast, no proposition of the form “It is true that *P*” could be true in virtue only of properties of the truth predicate or operator. The way I remember Beall telling it, a theory about *T* is in the business of telling you what propositions about *T* are true and which are false. However, it is not its business telling you when a proposition about *T* follows from another proposition about *T*, logic does. That is why the truth predicate (and the false predicate) are topic neutral (and in that sense, logical) in a way that the relation of logical consequence.

What Beall wants is pluralism about logicl entailment, without pluralism about truth. He wants for there to be many ‘right’ relations of logical consequence (not all equally good for any purpose, for some better fit for certain theoretical purposes and others better fit for other purposes), without the undesirable relativistic consequence that there are many ‘right’ properties of truth. Thus, he needs to drive a wedge between truth and logical consequence. Thus, it is not that there be a difference between truth and logical consequence. After all, that – that truth is not validity – is something we learn in our first day of introductory logic! Beall needs to show that this well known distinction between truth and logical validity somehow corresponds with a substantial way of drawing the line so that there is room for pluralism regarding logical consequence, but not regarding truth!

In an unpublished manuscipt, he writes:

“The construction of true theories involves the construction of consequence (closure) relations for those theories – an entailment relation that serves to ‘complete’ the theory (as far as possible) by churning out all of the truths that follow (that are entailed by) the claims in the theory…The theorist’s task is to construct a set of truths about a target phenomenon and close that set of truths under the consequence rela- tion that, by the theorist’s lights, is the right relation to ‘complete’ the true theory of the given phenomenon.”