Analytical philosophy displaced many rivals, in part, by ensuring that these would not appear in the leading journals (accompanied by a still familiar rhetoric of 'rigor,' 'clarity' and 'quality'). It did so by behaving like a faction with tough minded enforcers, bullies, who could be counted on never to recognize what is best in other approaches (Geach comes to mind), but only to find fault as well as the existence of strategic operators who did the hard drudgery of editing journals (but with cronyist, review practices which lasted through several generations--things have only just started to improve in the profession) and build institutions (Ryle, Black, etc.). . .
So far (very rough!) summary [of -Joel Katzav & Krist Vaesen (2017) "On the emergence of American analytic philosophy British Journal for the History of Philosophy ] (read the paper). I offer three further observations: 1. What is most striking about the Katzav & Vaesen narrative is that the factionalism of analytical philosophy occurred not in an environment when jobs/positions were scarce and, where, one might expect battles to exclude alternatives, but in the golden age of growth in American higher education. Analytical philosophy could still easily have flourished without keeping its rivals from the pages of leading journals (and later pushing them out from leading departments). 2. There was no American, local tradition of irrationalism (later associated with Heidegger and the Nietzscheanism of Continental philosophy). In a weird way, the later arrival of American 'continental' philosophy was a gift to analytical philosophy because it allowed the Carnapian narrative against it to flower (and displace all memory of alternative traditions). As Katzav & Vaesen note, only seventy years ago, the philosophical landscape Stateside was more diverse and stranger than we currently imagine. . .