What follows is a brief outline of a system of ideas in analytic philosophy which I have been developing. The system is not closed or final, and there is ample opportunity for further research connected with it. Here I have confined myself to stating the points I am most confident are correct. I might in future offer some more speculative results and indicate some avenues for further research.

I take certain parts of Kripke's work as a starting-point, especially the idea that there are necessary*a posteriori*and contingent

*a priori*truths, and the idea that names are rigid designators. On the other hand, I reject Millianism about names (which Kripke flirts with). My approach to characterizing meaning takes a lot of inspiration from Wittgenstein - the middle period especially, but also early and late.

I have elaborated some of these views at greater length, and attempted to extend their scope, at my blog Sprachlogik. This is an ongoing process with no end in sight.

I am very grateful that I have been able to come up with these ideas and develop them.

I plan to return to this outline after some months and improve it. I will then re-post it, adding links to relevant Sprachlogik posts (which I haven't done this time, since some crucial posts haven't appeared yet and I didn't want to do it by halves).

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A proposition is a propositional sign together with its internal meaning and its external meaning, i.e. its external projective relations to reality.

(This isn't much of an account of what it takes to be a proposition, since it leaves the notion of a propositional sign unanalyzed. But it does say something substantial about what sort of thing a proposition is.)

Internal meanings may be regarded as roles in language systems.

External projective relations may be thought of as referential relations as a first approximation. This is not quite right however, since we must be able to distinguish between an empty name here and on Twin Earth. Both have no reference, but as it were aim at different places, i.e. have different external projective relations.

A proposition is necessary iff it is, or is implied by, a proposition which is both inherently counterfactually invariant and true.

A proposition is inherently counterfactually invariant iff, if it is held true, it is held fixed across counterfactual scenario descriptions (i.e. its negation does not appear in counterfactual scenario descriptions).

Whether or not a proposition is inherently counterfactually invariant is a matter of the internal meaning of that proposition.

When I speak of 'counterfactual scenario descriptions', I mean not just those actually produced, but those which *can* be produced. Thus there is an unreduced modal element in my analysis of *de dicto* necessity. This is a feature, not a bug.

We must distinguish between genuine and non-genuine counterfactual scenario descriptions. In the case of the latter, we may always say that the meaning of at least one of the expressions involved is being violated or departed from. I take this notion as primitive.

We may also delineate the inherently counterfactual scenarios in another way: they are those which are such that it is* a priori* that they are necessary if true. I do not think we should think of this as giving the content of the notion, however. It is another way to get a handle on the relevant class of propositions, which may help us to get the notion.

To see why closure under implication is required, consider any disjunction of a necessary truth with a contingently true or false proposition. Such a disjunction will of course be necessary, but it will not be inherently counterfactually invariant, since it can be held true by holding the contingent proposition true and the necessary one false.

My analysis gets the right answer on such a case, since the proposition will be implied by a proposition which is both inherently counterfactually invariant and true - in the simple disjunction case, the necessary disjunct. However, note that the relevant implier will not always be a *part* of the proposition in question: consider 'Everything is either such that it is either not a cat or is an animal, or such that it is either less than 100 kilograms in weight or not in my room'. This is in fact necessarily true, since all cats are animals and that is a necessary truth. But you might hold it true if you disbelieve that all cats are animals, by believing that nothing in the speaker's room weighs more than 100 kilograms. If that is how you held it true, you would let its negation appear in counterfactual scenario descriptions - namely, descriptions of scenarios in which I have something heavy in my room.

A proposition is *a priori* iff its truth-value is determined by its internal meaning. (This sheds light on the metaphysics and epistemology of logic and mathematics.)

A proposition is analytic iff its truth-value is determined by (one of) its meaning-radical(s).

A meaning-radical may be thought of as that part of an expression's internal meaning which one must grasp in order to qualify as understanding it. This is an indefinite notion to be sure, but then so is that of analyticity.

The synthetic *a priori* is possible because internal meanings can outrun meaning-radicals. This is connected with the widely-scatteredness of meaning-determining facts, and the concept of a linguistic division of labour.

The solution to Frege's puzzle is that when 'a = b' is informative, 'a' and 'b' have different internal meanings.

Internal meanings of names also help us account for the meanings of singular existence propositions, and distinguish negative existential propositions from one another. Still, we must be on our guard against assimilating them with (if you like, other) predicative propositions. Likewise for identity and (if you like, other) relational propositions.

In contrast to Frege's senses, internal meanings do not in general determine reference. Internal meanings of names are not in general equivalent to descriptions. Names' having internal meanings is compatible with their being rigid designators.

Internal meanings, i.e. roles in language systems, can be individuated in different ways, carved up at different granularities. In this lies the solution to Kripke's puzzle about belief. (Does Pierre believe (the proposition that) London is pretty? Operating at a certain granularity, yes. Operating at a finer granularity, no.) This doctrine of semantic granularity can be used to resolve many other puzzles and disagreements in philosophy.